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Our lifeworlds are full of «mental institutions» [Gallagher & Cris-afi 2009]: rich networks of norm-governed practices, artifacts, and 
traditions that shape how we attend to and interact with the world and 
others. But not everyone inhabits the same networks of mental institu-
tions. For example, if the practice of law is a kind of mental institution 
(more on this later), then the specialized resources available within this 
institution will be unavailable to non-lawyers.
Within the last few years, philosophical discussions of mental in-
stitutions have arisen in the context of debates about “extended cogni-
tion”: the idea that cognition may, at times, physically extend into the 
environment via the artefacts, practices, and institutions that support 
our intelligent behavior. But this idea has not received much attention in 
philosophical psychiatry.1 In what follows, we argue that the notion of 
mental institutions can help better understand the origin and character 
of social impairments in autism, and also help illuminate the extent 
to which some mechanisms of autistic dysfunction extend across both 
internal and external factors (i.e., they do not just reside within an indi-
vidual’s head).
First, we provide some conceptual background. We focus on the 
1  Although this has recently started to change. See, for example, Cooper [2017]; Da-
vies [2016]; De Haan [forthcoming]; Fuchs [2018]; Hoffman [2016]; Krueger [2018]; 






connection between mental institutions and embodied habits of mind. 
Next, we discuss the significance of our view for understanding autistic 
habits of mind and consider why these embodied habits are sometimes a 
poor fit with neurotypical mental institutions. We conclude by consider-
ing how these insights highlight the two-way extended nature of social 
impairments in autism, and how this extended picture might assist in 
constructing more inclusive mental institutions for both neurotypicals 
and people with autism alike.
1. Extended (social) cognition
According to the hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC), the physical 
basis of cognition need not be confined to the head. Under certain cir-
cumstances, an individual’s mental states can include processes unfold-
ing not only in her brain and body but also within her environmental 
surround [Clark & Chalmers 1998]. By arguing that cognitive systems 
can include – i.e., be composed of – both biological and nonbiological 
parts, HEC explicitly challenges our thinking about where minds are 
and what they are made of.
A standard way to motivate HEC is by first identifying functional 
properties of some mental state or process and then showing that these 
properties can be realized by a heterogeneous system whose constit-
uents extend across brain, body, and world. For example, one way to 
characterize memory is as the storage and retrieval of information to 
which an individual has ready and reliable access. Often, this informa-
tion is realized entirely in the brain. But it need not be. It may be that 
individuals have equally as ready and reliable access to environmen-
tal resources – information encoded in notebooks, maps, smartphones, 
scraps of paper, and even other people – that, from the perspective of 
HEC, can be thought of as physical realizers of memory [Sutton 2010].
An important development in recent debates has been an increased 
focus on the social character of extended cognition. This social turn 
stresses not only the way that agents interact with a shared world but 
also the way the world, in turn, interacts with agents. It begins with 
the recognition that our cognitive practices arise within distinct socio-
cultural contexts, organized by specific material and normative aspects 
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that shape the form these practices take [Gillett & Menary 2016; Kirch-
hoff 2012; Stotz 2010]. 
Consider the Mycenaean Linear B tablets, a script predating the 
Greek alphabet that was used to write the earliest form of Greek on clay 
tablets [Malafouris 2013]. These tablets were cognitive artifacts with a 
mnemonic function: record keeping of numbers and quantities. Impor-
tantly, their physical structure also afforded new possibilities for the 
manipulation and representation of information. While the information 
inscribed directly on the surface of each tablet was fixed once the clay 
dried, smaller versions of the tablets could nevertheless be manipulat-
ed like index cards; the order in which the smaller tablets were filed 
was significant, beyond the information encoded on the surface. This 
manipulable structure not only enhanced real-time problem solving. It 
also transformed the physical boundaries of the relevant problem space, 
thereby restructuring problem-solving processes for subsequent users. 
Consequently, cultural practices arose around the production and use of 
these tablets and the new ways of organizing knowledge they support-
ed. These practices introduced new skills and affordances «that radi-
cally reconfigure[d] the cognitive ecology and the dynamics (including 
boundaries and connectivity) of the Mycenaean memory field for both 
current users and subsequent generations» [ibid., 81].
As this example shows, the social turn in HEC debates is important 
for several reasons. Not only does it foreground the central role others 
play in shaping our cognitive ecologies. Additionally, it foregrounds the 
extent to which these ecologies operate on us at multiple timescales. 
Early discussions of HEC mainly focused on real-time synchronic in-
teractions with cognitive artifacts, such as an individual with Alzhei-
mer’s consulting his ever-present, memory-augmenting notebook in or-
der to find his way to the museum. However, by socializing HEC in this 
deep cultural-historical sense, recent work [e.g., Cash 2010; Fabry 2018; 
Hutchins 2011; Kirchhoff 2012; Malafouris 2016; Menary 2013; Merritt 
2013] productively broadens debates to highlight the structuring role 
cognitive extensions play at a diachronic scale. As Cash puts this idea, 
«Our institutions, our languages, and the very cognitive and normative 
practices within which we cognize have been shaped by us to make 





that language-enabled humans possess» [Cash 2010, 664]. In sum, these 
reflections show us how our cognitive ecologies – and the material ar-
tifacts and norm-governed practices that comprise them – scaffold the 
diachronic development of cognitive, affective, and behavioral habits 
distinctive of those who share that milieu.
2. Mental institutions and their embodiment
From the perspective of HEC, our habits of mind – broadly speaking, 
our characteristic ways of attending to, interpreting, and engaging with 
the world – are ecologically structured. This structuring process begins 
early in development. For example, even before they learn language, 
infants are enculturated into nonverbal habits of shared communication 
– rhythmic turn-taking contingencies, forms of emotional expression, 
patterns of vocalization, attention regulation, etc. – that extend their so-
cial-cognitive competence and reflect the norms, values, and patterned 
practices distinctive of their sociocultural milieu [Krueger 2013]. These 
patterned practices are the building blocks of what Gallagher calls 
«mental institutions»: assemblages of social practices, institutions, and 
norm-governed artifacts that furnish access to novel abilities or features 
of the world otherwise beyond our reach [Gallagher 2013; Gallagher & 
Crisafi 2009]. As we will see, mental institutions both extend cognition 
and present top-down constraints on embodied habits of mind.
For Gallagher, mental institutions have two core features: (1) they 
consist of cognitive artifacts and practices produced in specific times 
and places, and (2) they are activated in ways that extend our cognitive 
processes when we engage with them in the right sort of way [Gallagher 
2013, 6]. Mental institutions take many forms: from academic, scientif-
ic, legal, and religious institutions to more encompassing cultural and 
economic practices. Gallagher’s focus is on the various ways mental 
institutions extend cognition insofar as they open up otherwise inacces-
sible cognitive processes.
For example, he argues that certain legal judgments – like evaluating 
the legitimacy of a particular claim – are only possible when individ-
uals engage with artifacts and practices that make up the mental insti-
tution of law. This institution furnishes an array of external resources 
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(e.g., contracts, systems of rights and laws, norm-governed procedures, 
precedence, etc.) that enable individuals to manipulate and work through 
large amounts of information they couldn’t otherwise process without 
this external support. Similarly, when dealing with complex theories 
and phenomena, scientists’ reasoning processes may extend across a 
heterogeneous system composed of both internal and external resources: 
tools, props, and various representational devices, along with the suite 
of norm-governed practices governing their use [Toon 2015]. Guided by 
these kinds of observations, Gallagher concludes that if we say that cog-
nition supervenes on individual artifacts like notebooks, maps, smart-
phones, and microscopes, we ought to likewise grant cognitive status to 
mental institutions designed specifically to augment our cognitive prac-
tices [Gallagher 2013, 7].
This is not the place to independently motivate Gallagher’s argu-
ment.2 Instead, we are interested in exploring how the notion of mental 
institutions might help us better understand the origin and character of 
social impairments in autism, and more specifically how this notion can 
illuminate the extent to which some mechanisms of autistic dysfunction 
extend across both internal and external factors. In order to do so, it will 
be useful to bring Maiese’s [2018] recent analysis of habits of mind and 
social institutions into this discussion. This analysis is useful because it 
can fruitfully enrich Gallagher’s discussion of mental institutions, and 
the social turn in HEC more generally, in two key respects: by stressing 
both the embodied and potentially maladaptive character of mental-in-
stitution-supported habits of mind.
For Gallagher, mental institutions remain largely external to the in-
dividual.3 They are persistent environmental resources that users can, for 
a time, integrate with and thus use to extend their cognitive capacities in 
2  See the papers in Merritt and Varga [2013] for critical engagements with his view. 
3  To be fair, this is somewhat misleading because HEC challenges strict internal-ex-
ternal boundaries when it comes to thinking about the location and constitution of 
cognitive systems. And nothing in Gallagher’s analysis is inconsistent with Maiese’s 
discussion of habits of mind and social institutions – although Maiese adopts an en-
active perspective instead of HEC. For our purposes, what’s important is that Maiese 
focuses on specific aspects of our bodily practices that aren’t given explicit attention 
in Gallagher’s discussion, and which can therefore fruitfully supplement his account.





order to accomplish some otherwise-inaccessible task. Their cognitive 
impact is therefore short-lived and primarily positive: to productively 
augment institution-specific habits of mind. However, Maiese’s analysis 
helps illuminate how the values, norms, beliefs, and practices that make 
up mental institutions become internalized and sedimented within an 
array of unreflective bodily habits that shape our everyday interactions. 
Additionally, Maiese draws our attention to the fact that not all of these 
habits of mind are positive. While mental institutions cultivate practices 
and habits that promote human flourishing – e.g., by enhancing cogni-
tion or facilitating richer forms of human connection – they may also 
contribute to maladaptive habits that interfere with overall well-being. 
In other words, we are vulnerable to maladaptive manipulation by men-
tal institutions in a way that hasn’t been widely considered within HEC 
debates.4 Understanding the latter will be particularly useful for under-
standing the connection between mental institutions, on the one hand, 
and social impairments and the experience of alienation in autism, on 
the other.
2.1. Mental institutions and habits of mind
Bodies are socially saturated and socio-normatively laden. This claim 
involves more than just the benign observation that cognition and affec-
tivity are always socially contextualized. More substantively, we argue 
that cognition and affectivity are directly modulated by the artifacts, 
relationships, and norms – the mental institutions – distinctive of that 
context. Our habits of mind depend upon both internal and external 
constraints.5
Some examples will help clarify this point. Consider the unreflective 
way we fluidly adopt different styles of speaking, gesturing, behaving, 
and expressing emotions as we negotiate different interpersonal contexts. 
Extravagant expressions of humor (big open-mouthed smile, loud laugh-
4  Although Sterelny [2010] is attuned to this possibility, as is Slaby [2016] (discussed 
in more detail below).
5  See Higgins [2017] for a complementary discussion of the ways that social norms 
become embodied in habitual practices.
© 2018 Thaumàzein
10.13136/thau.v6i0 16
ter, dramatic gestures) may be welcome during a night out with friends, 
but they will be perceived as disruptive in more formal settings such as 
a professional meeting or place of worship. So, we adjust our expressive 
style accordingly as we move through these different contexts. Similarly, 
we attend to and interpret the world in a different way when out for a 
casual night with friends than we do, say, when participating in a sporting 
event or political rally, or when negotiating an unfamiliar city for the first 
time. For example, one might be more inclined to pick up on and respond 
negatively to a dirty look from a stranger – or conversely, respond posi-
tively to a flirty glance – when buttressed by the encouragement of bois-
terous friends than when alone; when touring a city with an architectural 
historian friend, we will be more attuned to specific features of familiar 
buildings and built spaces. Evaluative appraisals of salience are modulat-
ed by our interpersonal context.6
This variation is not simply a matter of internal constraints, such 
as feeling timid during an important meeting with one’s peers and not 
speaking up. Again, the key point is that contextual differences in habits 
of mind are also heavily modulated by ecological constraints: back-
ground forces, norms, and expectations – constitutive features of men-
tal institutions – that contour the dynamics of our bodily responses and 
patterns of appraisal as we negotiate different environments. Crucially, 
we are vulnerable to being manipulated by these ecological constraints 
without our full awareness or consent. For example, unspoken gender 
norms appear to nudge women to both expect and accept more frequent 
interruptions than male counterparts [Hancock & Rubin 2015].
Slaby’s [2016] discussion of the impact of workplace culture on 
cognition and affect helps to further illuminate the structuring role 
mental institutions play in shaping maladaptive habits of mind. Men-
tal institutions distinctive of a particular workplace involve a complex, 
multi-format assemblage of shared norms, practices, and artifacts that 
scaffold processes of cognition and appraisal required to accomplish 
various tasks. Like the legal reasoning case discussed previously, cer-
tain forms of medical knowledge, for instance, might only be possible 
when individuals actively integrate with the artifacts, technologies, and 
6  See Ratcliffe [2016] for a discussion of this idea in the context of self-disturbances 
in schizophrenia.





norm-governed practices of a clinical workspace [Pimmer et al. 2013]. 
But workplace ecologies can infiltrate habits of mind in a more subver-
sive and potentially disruptive way.
As Slaby [2016] observes, the «presence bleed» of contemporary 
knowledge work – the expectation that one should constantly be online 
and available for work-related communication via email or instant mes-
saging – erodes clear-cut boundaries between work time and leisure. 
Ubiquitous communication technologies like smartphones are deeply 
entrenched in everyday habits of mind and usefully extend an array 
of cognitive practices. Yet, as Slaby notes, the timing and location of 
our engagement with them can also reinforce institutional practices and 
expectations (e.g., persistent availability, expectations regarding how 
quickly problems ought to be dealt with) that potentially encourage mal-
adaptive habits of mind: lingering feelings of guilt, excessive responsi-
bility, anxiety, or an inability to “unplug” and enjoy non-work-related 
activities. This is because individuals are drawn into modes of interac-
tion, often by way of affective attunement and habituation to interac-
tion patterns and modes of valuation that are normative for that domain 
[Maiese 2018, 13]. So, an individual who starts working in a high-pres-
sure corporate workplace may find themselves coming to diachroni-
cally embody the maladaptive norms of that mental institution, even if 
they are not fully aware of it (e.g., reflexively checking for new email 
every few minutes when at home or out with friends). Additionally, their 
ongoing adherence to these norms ensures that the larger mental institu-
tion they are part of will continue to structure this maladaptive ecology 
for other agents. For example, if an individual’s colleagues establish 
a workplace culture where important email communication routinely 
occurs beyond regular working hours, their failure to adhere to this 
norm will stand out and they may face increasing pressure to adapt 
— at the expense of their home life. Workplace ecologies can in this 
way diachronically “invade” individuals over time, and at a concrete 
bodily level. They establish top-down constraints that selectively nudge 
individuals toward maladaptive habits of mind that can potentially have 
deleterious downstream effects on their own and others’ wellbeing.
These observations about the interactive dynamics between mental 
institutions and embodied habits of mind highlight two points impor-
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tant for what follows. First, they remind us that mental institutions are 
not free-standing things that are largely external to the individual, apart 
from the limited duration of our synchronic engagements with them. 
Rather, we are bodily «tattooed» [Grosz 1994] by these institutions, in-
sofar as they structure the range of cognitive, affective, and behavioral 
possibilities available to us as we inhabit them. Second, the ongoing 
enactment of our habits of mind collectively feed back onto and rein-
force the mental institutions that constrain them. Embodied subjects are 
not only shaped by their social world; they also help shape their social 
environment through active and reactive contributions and responses. 
Importantly, however, this observation further shows us that while sub-
jects do tend to act in ways that reinforce norm-governed mental insti-
tutions, they can also defy and undermine them, in a range of different 
ways and to varying degrees. These acts of resistance can lead to new 
habits of attention, thought, feeling, and bodily response [Maiese 2018, 
14-15]. We now explore this latter point by looking at the interrelation 
between mental institutions, embodiment, and social impairments in 
autism.
3. Instituting impairment: autism, embodiment, and mental institutions7
We now apply the previous discussion to autistic spectrum disorder 
(ASD). Building off the earlier discussion of HEC, mental institutions, 
and habits of mind, we argue that some of the social impairments dis-
tinctive of ASD aren’t entirely located in individual heads. We discuss 
the significance of this view for understanding autistic habits of mind, 
why these embodied habits of mind are sometimes a poor fit with neu-
rotypical mental institutions, and finally how these insights might help 
us construct more inclusive mental institutions.
First, some background. ASD is a complex developmental disorder 
spanning a spectrum of social, communicative, imaginative, and be-
havioral abnormalities. These abnormalities are wide-ranging and can 
vary with age and individual ability. They include non-verbal commu-
nicative deficits; repetitive behaviors; difficulties in adjusting actions to 
7  The notion of «instituting impairment» is taken from Merritt [2013].





suit a social context; fixated interests, especially in sensory qualities of 
objects; and diminished imaginative capacities, such as the absence of 
pretend play in childhood [Frith 2003; Rutter & Schopler 1987; Stone 
et al. 1997]. ASD also tends to include deficits in affective bonding 
and emotion-related behavior [Hill & Frith 2003; Hobson 1993]. For 
example, people with ASD often avoid direct eye gaze, have difficulty 
seeing and interpreting social cues in gestures and facial expressions, 
and struggle to connect and develop relationships with their peers. Most 
behaviors needed to establish and regulate social interactions are im-
paired in ASD [Gallese & Rochat 2018].
There is currently no consensus about the exact cause of autism. 
However, the five «big ideas» [Frith 2003] dominating current debates 
– Theory of Mind-style explanations; Weak Central Coherence Theo-
ry; Executive Function Theories; the Broken Mirror Neuron Hypoth-
esis; and the Social Motivation Hypothesis – are, despite other differ-
ences, committed to an internalist position insofar as they conceive of 
the root cause of ASD as located inside the head of the individual. But 
there are reasons to be skeptical of this internalist commitment.8 For 
our purposes, two worries are salient. First, these approaches overlook 
key embodied and relational features of ASD social impairments, in-
cluding both self-other mapping deficits that arise from a dysfunction 
of perception-action coupling systems [Rochat et al. 2013], as well as 
distinct ways of moving, perceiving, and emoting that define autistic 
ways of being-in-the-world [Constant et al. 2018; Krueger forthcom-
ing; Leary & Donnellan 2012]. Second, they overlook the central role 
that interpersonally-distributed factors play in shaping dysfunctions 
characteristic of ASD [De Jaegher 2013; Gallagher & Varga 2015; 
Hobson 2002; León 2019; Schilbach 2016]. Conceptual resources 
from the previous discussion of HEC and mental institutions can help 
address these worries and thus be used to develop richer characteriza-
tions of ASD experience.
8  See Bolis et al. [2017] and De Jaegher [2013] for further discussion.
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3.1. “Local” mental institutions and (neurotypical) embodiment
Gallagher’s discussion of mental institutions primarily focuses on large-
scale mental institutions such as legal systems and academic research 
practices. However, we find mental institutions at work at a more local 
level, too, regulating the dynamics of our everyday engagements with 
others. For example, commuter trains, grocery stores, and cocktail par-
ties all can be understood as institutions that regulate our behavior and 
interactions. These local mental institutions are particularly relevant to 
understanding some of the social difficulties that people with ASD face 
on an everyday basis.
One of the lessons of Gallagher’s analysis of mental institutions, 
particularly when conjoined with a complementary discussion of em-
bodied habits of mind, is that much of our everyday understanding of 
others and the world more generally is carried not just by brain-based 
processes or internal “mentalizing” strategies, but also by beyond-the-
head practices designed specifically to make us intelligible to one an-
other as social agents [Zawidzki 2013]. These norm-guided practices 
are examples of «epistemic actions» [Kirsh & Maglio 1994] that have 
several cognitive functions. They can augment cognition by furnishing 
access to novel abilities and/or features of the world otherwise beyond 
our reach (e.g., rendering legal judgments). This augmenting function 
is Gallagher’s primary focus. But they can also extrapolate existing 
capacities, the way that microscopes bring small things into the range 
of visual detection; and they may even convert phenomena accessible 
in one modality into a form accessible in another, the way that sonar de-
vices with visual displays convert worldly events (e.g., flight paths) into 
a digital-representational format [Humphreys 2004]. And they do these 
things while regulating our behavior in predictable ways.
Consider playing chess. Chess-playing occurs within a mental in-
stitution: it is an activity organized by a rich network of rules, prac-
tices, artifacts, and expectations that exist prior to token episodes of 
chess-playing. What is important here is that, when playing chess with 
someone, we needn’t rely upon an intracranial capacity to infer our op-
ponent’s desire to play chess and intention to do so fairly; rather, we see 
these things directly in their playing, just as they see our desires and 
intentions in our chess-playing behavior. In other words, we make our-





selves intelligible to one another by conforming over time to the insti-
tutional practices, rules, and strategies of playing chess [McGeer 2015]. 
Following Humphreys [2004], we can say that the local institution reg-
ulating this shared practice converts a computationally demanding folk 
psychological task (making inferences about others’ mental states) into 
an easier perceptual-motor task (jointly coordinating our behavior to 
shared rules of chess) – and, in doing so, reduces the descriptive com-
plexity of the environment by guiding our attention to salient features 
of our opponent’s norm-governed behavior. It thereby assists us with the 
process of selective attention.
This is just one example of a local mental institution. They take 
many forms, and vary with time and place: playing games; lining up in 
the queue to board a train or airplane; placing our menu on the table as 
a signal that we’re ready to order; taking a phone call in the vestibule to 
avoid irritating fellow rail travelers in the quiet carriage; pausing in a 
conversation to let the other person finish a thought; or expressing our 
disapproval with a well-timed eyebrow raise. Van Dijk and Rietveld 
[2017] give the example of being seated in a “silence area” in a train, so 
that talking is not really an option; nor is drinking from the bottle of wa-
ter that belongs to one’s neighbor. For those operating within a mental 
institution, «certain models of expectancy come to be established, and 
the patterns, which over time emerge from these practices, guide per-
ception as well as action» [Roepstorff et al. 2010, 1056]. Many aspects 
of social understanding are in this way carried by the world, scaffolded 
by the norms and routines that regulate our embodied interactions and 
habits of mind, and which have their social significance built into them 
[McGeer 2001]. Understanding others involves bringing shared norms 
to bear, for our sense of what people generally do and what they can be 
expected to do is linked to our views about what they ought to do. The 
ability to apply norms and identify situations in which relevant routines 
are appropriate rests on a capacity for navigating different social con-
texts.
To return to HEC, we thus see that local mental institutions extend 
cognition at multiple timescales. On a synchronic basis, they provide 
the regulatory tracks upon which token episodes of social interaction 
run and acquire their normative character. This is a process that be-
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gins at birth, within infant-caregiver interactions. However, repeated 
engagements with local mental institutions also shape the diachronic 
development of bodily practices and habits of mind that are respon-
sive to the institutions, habits that become sedimented within our more 
general way of negotiating the world. That is, we learn these rules over 
the course of learning and socialization; when our behavior conforms 
to shared expectations, it is met with approval and praised; and when 
it fails to conform to these expectations, it is met with disapproval and 
sanctioned. Over time, we internalize norms and shared expectations in 
the form of characteristic behavior or habits.
What Rietveld and Kiverstein [2014] call «situated normativity» 
encompasses norms of adequacy and inadequacy associated with ha-
bitual behavior within sociocultural settings. As children engage with 
aspects of the environment, their performance is subject to normative 
assessment as better or worse, and as more or less correct given situa-
tional demands. As a child attempts to name various colors, for exam-
ple, she receives feedback about the appropriateness of her responses 
and thereby acquires a feel for which uses are acceptable. Which color 
names are better or worse, correct or incorrect, depends in part on so-
ciocultural norms and the specific setting in which color naming takes 
place [ibid., 332]. Whereas a more coarse-grained categorization may 
be appropriate when it comes to traffic signs, clothing and home décor 
may call out for a more nuanced naming of particular shades. What 
counts as adequate-color naming will depend, in large part, on what 
other members of a sociocultural practice do. Along similar lines, a 
child will learn how to engage with various tools and artifacts, and how 
to conduct herself within various social settings.  When she fails to con-
form to expectations, she will receive feedback that alerts her to this. 
She will, for example, be corrected or scolded, often by way of subtle 
indicators of social disapproval.
To return to ASD, the salient point is this: because people with 
ASD lack (for reasons discussed below) experiential access to many of 
the normative features of neurotypical mental institutions, they are ex-
cluded from the social-cognitive benefits and embodied habits of mind 
these institutions help to develop, regulate, and sustain. Such difficulty 
is connected to the fact that in neurotypical institutions shared expec-





tations often are conveyed by way of very fine-grained nuances in tone 
of voice, facial expression, posture, and other forms of body language. 
Because people with ASD lack access to these fine-grained features, 
they find it difficult to engage effectively with others within these so-
cial environments. This lack of experiential access is a key part of the 
social difficulties they face in negotiating the neurotypical world. Im-
portantly, however, this lack of access is not an “in principle” exclusion. 
There are ways of co-constructing more inclusive mental institutions 
that both neurotypicals and people with ASD may jointly inhabit and 
benefit from.
3.2. ASD, embodiment, and alternative habits of mind
We now unpack this claim in several steps. First, we discuss the explan-
atory significance of the distinct ways that people with ASD experien-
tially inhabit and use their bodies to move, express emotions, and attend 
to the world and others. Next, we consider why and how the distinctive 
character of these embodied habits of mind fail to be responsively inte-
grated into neurotypical mental institutions, and how this lack of inte-
gration leads to social difficulties for people with ASD.
To begin with the first step: people with ASD often use their bod-
ies in ways that, from a neurotypical perspective, may appear unusual 
or off-putting. For example, they may repeatedly shrug, squint, pout, 
or rock back and forth; repeatedly touch specific objects; turn away 
when someone attempts to speak with them; maintain unusual or inert 
postures, or appear to get “stuck” in indecisive movements; have diffi-
culty imitating actions; and require explicit verbal or gestural prompts 
to perform an action [Donnellan et al. 2012; Leary & Donnellan 2012; 
Robledo et al. 2012]. A particularly salient example is a delay in conver-
sational responses. Donnellan and colleagues found that twelve young 
adolescents with minimal verbal skills, all of whom were labeled devel-
opmentally disabled or autistic, were, in fact, capable of offering com-
petent conversational responses – but only, on average, after fourteen 
seconds of silence [Leary & Donnellan 2012, 57]. However, such a de-
lay violates neurotypical norms; most neurotypicals would likely find a 
pause this long uncomfortable and either change the subject or abandon 
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the conversation. ASD habits of mind thus often fail to mesh smoothly 
with neurotypical institutions.
These are embodied ASD habits of mind observable from an exter-
nal third-person perspective. However, first-person reports also indicate 
that people with ASD often experience their bodies in ways that differ 
from neurotypicals. They experience difficulties controlling, executing, 
and combining movements – from fine motor control, grip planning, 
and anticipatory movements, to more complex action-sequences like 
reaching for a book, dancing, or negotiating a crowded hallway [Eigsti 
2013; Leary & Hill 1996; Whyatt & Craig 2013]. This feeling stems 
not simply from measurable coordination difficulties but also from a 
felt sense of diminished agency and loss of bodily control, including 
diminished proprioceptive and kinaesthetic awareness [Blanche et al. 
2012; Robledo et al. 2012]. These experiential difficulties can lead to 
challenges when it comes to effortlessly engaging with the environment 
and other people – that is, smoothly integrating with neurotypical pat-
terns of interaction and habits of mind. Some individuals with ASD are 
aware of these differences. One person reports that «I was sitting on the 
floor and when I got up after looking at a couple of books, my friend 
said I got up like an animal does» – and furthermore, that although she 
is aware that her patterns of movement and habits of mind are different 
from those of neurotypicals, she remains unaware of how they differ, 
exactly [Robledo et al. 2012, 6].
These reports lend support to the idea that people with ASD ex-
hibit a kind of perceptual «style blindness»: an inability to perceive 
expressive or stylistic qualities of neurotypical patterns of movement 
and embodied habits of mind [Krueger forthcoming]. As a result, they 
lack experiential access to socially-salient information needed to fit into 
and become responsively regulated by the expressive norms governing 
neurotypical mental institutions. When we speak of stylistic qualities of 
movement, we are referring to the specific way an action is performed, 
its qualitative character.9 For instance, we can reach out to shake some-
one’s hand in a friendly, aggressive, or indifferent manner; similarly, 
a smile can be cold, sarcastic, confident, or wry. These are expressive 
9  Daniel Stern [2010] calls these qualities «forms of vitality».





qualities of actions that carry socially salient information. To under-
stand the intentions and meanings of others’ actions, it is not enough to 
simply see the action itself. We must also perceive the social informa-
tion encoded in its style, that is, within the qualitative dynamics of its 
performance. And these stylistic features often are very subtle. Consid-
er the fine-grained difference between a friendly kiss and a lover’s kiss, 
as well as between playful sarcasm and angry sarcasm. To distinguish 
between the two types of kiss, one must attend to the highly specific 
features of the kissing movements as they unfold; and to distinguish 
between the two types of sarcasm, one must attend to highly specific, 
often subtle, features of the speaker’s volume and intonation patterns.
There is evidence that individuals with ASD lack perceptual access 
to these fine-grained stylistic features of actions. Several studies high-
light atypical processing of low-level, sensory, and perceptual informa-
tion in ASD [Dakin & Frith 2005; Happé 1999; Mottron et al. 2006]. 
There is evidence, for instance, that children with ASD struggle to ex-
tract relevant information from biological cues [Rutherford et al. 2006]; 
they also fail to correctly interpret human activities portrayed in point 
light displays [Blake & Shiffrar 2007]. Other studies have found that 
both children and adults with ASD struggle to decode visual informa-
tion found in facial expressions and actions [Ashwin et al. 2006; Atkin-
son 2009; Hubert et al. 2007; Teunisse & de Gelder 2001], and to extract 
social-emotional information from vocal cues [Philip et al. 2010].
Perhaps the most powerful support for style blindness in ASD is 
found in a recent study by Rochat et al. [2013].10 Twenty high-function-
ing patients with ASD, along with twenty neurotypical controls, watched 
a series of short video clips involving two people sitting across from one 
another at a table, performing different actions. These actions included 
giving a high five, shaking hands, pointing, caressing the other person’s 
forearm, taking the other’s hand, giving or retrieving a mug, and hold-
ing up their hand to signal “stop”. In these clips, the same type of action 
was performed with a different style: e.g., a vigorous handshake in one 
clip, a gentle handshake in another. Participants in the study viewed dif-
ferent combinations of these action clips and were then asked to make 
10  See also Gallese and Rochat [2018].
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judgments about them. While participants with ASD were similar to 
neurotypicals in identifying kinds of actions (e.g., handshake vs. high-
five), they made frequent errors when making judgments about the style 
of different actions, including difficulty recognizing similar styles (e.g., 
gentle) across different actions (e.g., handshake vs. high five). Accord-
ing to the authors, these findings advance previous work insofar as they 
suggest that style blindness is not limited to imitative contexts (e.g., 
such as when an individual with ASD is asked to imitate an observed 
action) but that it is, rather, a primary deficit – a perceptual inability to 
extract socially salient information from the qualitative kinematics of 
others’ actions [ibid., 1922].
This style blindness is significant for how people with ASD inhabit 
– or fail to inhabit – neurotypical mental institutions. This is because, 
within such institutions, people’s desires and expectations often are 
communicated via fine-grained modulations in the qualitative dynamics 
of action and expression. These modulations include an ever-so-slight 
raise of the eyebrows to signal skepticism, subtle modifications in the 
tone of voice to signal sarcasm, or subtle changes in posture to indicate, 
“you’re annoying me; stop talking”. Conforming to social norms and 
expectations within neurotypical institutions requires that subjects be 
able to gauge fine-grained features of other’s bodily expressions. How-
ever, subjects with ASD find it difficult to attend to these features; and 
without perceptual access to stylistic features of neurotypical patterns 
of behavior, people with ASD often cannot smoothly participate in the 
everyday practices of neurotypical institutions and understand the emo-
tions and intentions of others. Moreover, the ability to imitate these ex-
pressive kinematics is a core skill needed to be responsively regulated 
by the different (local) mental institutions through which we move on a 
day-to-day basis [Lakin et al. 2003; Meltzoff & Decety 2003]. However, 
without this capacity, people with ASD lack fluent access to the cogni-
tive and emotional benefits these ritualistic practices confer [Ingersoll 
2008; Stewart et al. 2013]. Because subjects with ASD have difficulty 
detecting these subtle social cues, they sometimes turn to general rules 
or explicit theorizing strategies to compensate [Shanker 2004].
From the perspective of HEC, there is a sense in which children and 
adults with ASD can be said to inhabit different social worlds – under-





stood as collections of mental institutions that shape distinctive habits 
of mind – than neurotypicals do [Klin et al. 2003]. But, to be clear, it’s 
not the case that people with ASD lack access to any kind of norm-gov-
erned mental institution whatsoever; nor is it the case that they lack 
access to neurotypical mental institutions entirely. Clearly, they do have 
some degree of access to the latter. People with autism are part of our 
shared world and, to varying degrees, responsive to what neurotypical 
people say and do. Rather, the point is that they have diminished prac-
tical fluency when it comes to engaging with neurotypical institutions, 
the way a non-scientist may lack practical fluency with a microscope or 
set of research practices and thus lack access to the cognitive benefits 
and habits of mind scientific institutions confer. This diminished practi-
cal fluency occurs because the signposts for social interaction found in 
neurotypical institutions typically are too fine-grained and nuanced for 
subjects with ASD to gauge.
Nevertheless, the social worlds and mental institutions of ASD 
may have their own norm-governed character, one not easily accessible 
to neurotypical partners. This becomes clearer by first observing that 
some of the unusual movements, behavior, and habits of mind people 
with ASD exhibit are more than meaningless reflexes or nervous tics. 
Rather, they are environmentally responsive and often situationally-ap-
propriate; they play an important role in helping individuals with ASD 
adapt to and negotiate changing environments. For example, patterns 
of “self-stimulation” or “self-stims” – which consist of behavior like 
hand-flapping, finger-snapping, tapping objects, repetitive vocaliza-
tions, or rocking back and forth – may be context-sensitive habits of 
mind that help to organize incoming sensory flows in order to manage 
the physical, perceptual, and emotional demands of a given situation 
[Leary & Donnellan 2012, 51]. In cases where this incoming informa-
tion threatens to be overwhelming (i.e., hypersensitivity), self-stims 
can occlude signal noise and down-regulate the individual’s anxiety; 
alternatively, in cases where the individual requires heightened arousal 
in order to better access salient information (i.e., hyposensitivity), self-
stims can have an arousal-generating, attention-directing effect. Self-
stims thus can be understood as a way to strengthen selective attention 
so that subjects can ignore irrelevant information and focus on what is 
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important; this puts them in a better position to gauge relevant social 
cues. So, treatment programs that have traditionally tried to eliminate 
or suppress self-stims [e.g., Azrin et al. 1973] have failed to see their 
norm-governed character and the positive role they may play within 
autistic habits of mind.
Additionally, there is evidence that many social difficulties people 
with ASD face result from the fact that neurotypical norms, expecta-
tions, and mental institutions simply aren’t adequate to meet the needs 
or idiosyncratic features of ASD habits of mind. What makes them 
inadequate is that these norms and expectations often are unspoken, 
highly context-specific, and communicated by way of nuanced body 
language. Because subjects with ASD rely primarily on straightforward 
verbal expressions and more coarse-grained body language to commu-
nicate, neurotypical mental institutions often do not suit them.
To see this, note that within neurotypical mental institutions, the abil-
ity to use language appropriately and understand what others say goes 
well beyond knowing the literal meaning of the expression used. It also 
involves an appreciation of the setting in which the speech occurs. The 
meaning of “Mark is at the bank”, for example, is highly context-sensi-
tive, and rests on knowledge about whether Mark frequently goes angling 
at the river or instead works at Chase Manhattan [de Villiers et al. 2007, 
295]. de Villiers and colleagues found that subjects with ASD do not have 
much difficulty with the appropriate use of language when it comes to 
the content of literal speech, but exhibit pronounced deficits with respect 
to figurative speech. This makes it difficult for them to understand meta-
phor, irony, and conversational implicature [ibid., 315]. Understanding the 
meaning of figurative speech requires that subjects attend to fine-grained 
contextual features and gauge the desires and intentions of those who 
are speaking, but these desires and intentions typically are conveyed via 
highly nuanced aspects of bodily expression and comportment. Because 
subjects with ASD find it challenging to engage in this sort of selective 
attention, often they say things that lack relevance to the hearer, do not 
anticipate what hearers will want to know, and take figurative speech (in-
cluding metaphor, sarcasm, and irony) literally.
But it is possible to design institutions that are a better fit for subjects 
with ASD. This observation is strengthened by findings that high-func-





tioning autistic people report pleasurable and efficient interactions with 
other autistic persons, even when they struggle to connect with neuro-
typical mental institutions [Komeda et al. 2015; Schilbach 2016]. This is 
because their interactions with other people with ASD take place within 
mental institutions governed by ASD-friendly norms and expectations. 
In these settings, the norm is for people to speak in more straightfor-
ward terms, relying primarily on literal language rather than metaphor 
and more clearly signaling the use of sarcasm. For example, if a subject 
with ASD wants someone to stop talking, the expectation may be that 
s/he simply will say “stop talking”. This request will not be understood 
as rude or impertinent but as clear and competent communication of her 
desires. So, it’s not as though people with ASD lack social competence 
entirely. Rather, their impairment is heightened when trying to inhabit 
and engage with mental institutions that aren’t organized in ways de-
signed to accommodate ASD habits of mind.
In sum, these insights suggest that the disturbance of breakdown 
leading to social impairments in ASD is, in an important sense, a two-
way impairment, and not just confined to the head of the individual 
with ASD [McGeer 2009, 310]. It includes environmental features: neu-
rotypical institutions that lack the flexibility and inclusivity needed to 
responsively mesh with ASD habits of mind. As we’ll see in the fi-
nal section, such considerations may have important consequences for 
thinking about intervention and therapeutic strategies.
4. Further implications and conclusion
As we’ve discussed, ASD has for several decades been thought to con-
sist in a Theory of Mind deficit. This assumption has shaped treatment 
and intervention strategies, which have generally been geared toward 
helping individuals develop their individual mentalizing capacities 
[Begeer 2014]. However, based on the previous considerations, we can 
highlight at least two shortcomings of such approaches. First, they over-
look the role that embodied and interactive features play in shaping 
characteristic impairments and offer few resources for addressing these 
features. Second, they presuppose that social difficulties in ASD con-
sist in a failure to conform to normative expectations of neurotypicals, 
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without acknowledging (or offering resources to address) the two-way 
nature of these impairments.
If, as we’ve argued, autism is fundamentally an embodied and re-
lational phenomenon – and not simply an in-the-head cognitive deficit 
– intervention strategies should be tailored accordingly. One promising 
strategy is music therapy, which can involve listening, singing, or joint 
music-making. Srinivasan and Bhat [2013] observed that music-based 
interventions are attractive for individuals with ASD for three rea-
sons. First, they can address core impairments in joint attention, so-
cial reciprocity, and verbal and nonverbal communication, along with 
comorbidities of atypical perception, motor performance, and behav-
ioral problems. Second, children with ASD often have enhanced pitch 
processing abilities and musical memory compared to typically devel-
oping children and therefore may find these interventions particularly 
pleasurable [Heaton 2003]. Third, music-based activities can provide 
non-intimidating contexts to interact with musical instruments and oth-
er people by engaging in predictable musically-guided interactions with 
social partners [Darrow & Armstrong 1999].
Evidence suggests that these kinds of musical interventions posi-
tively impact various forms of development, including communicative, 
social-emotional, and motor development. For example, music thera-
pies can facilitate verbal and gestural skills in children with ASD; en-
hance social skills such as eye contact, joint attention, mimicry, and 
turn-taking; and support the improvement of fine and gross motor skills 
[Srinivasan & Bhat 2013]. This can help subjects with ASD to strength-
en their ability to gauge fine-grained social cues and their capacity for 
“body-reading”. In a music setting, subjects do rely on bodily expres-
sion to communicate – but eye contact, bodily expressions, and mim-
icry are more exaggerated than in standard neurotypical settings. And 
because they are punctuated by changes in musical tone and rhythm, 
they are easier for subjects with ASD to detect.
In this way, musical activities like listening, singing, and joint mu-
sic-making provide a regulative context in which children with ASD can 
work with neurotypicals to construct alternative musically-guided men-
tal institutions. Musically-generated auditory and rhythmic signals can 
regulate attention and movement in a number of ways: by influencing 





the timing of motor neuron discharge; decreasing felt muscle fatigue; 
facilitating automatic movements by providing predictable temporal 
cues; improving reaction time and response quality through facilitated 
responsive anticipation; and providing auditory feedback for proprio-
ceptive control mechanisms [Thaut 1988, 130]. Music can thus serve 
as scaffolding for the development of selective attention and strengthen 
subjects’ ability to detect social cues [Krueger 2019; Maiese 2016].
In addition, the opportunity to interact in a musical setting may 
help counteract the tendency of some subjects with ASD to withdraw 
from social interaction. Shanker [2004] notes that because subjects with 
ASD are sometimes overreactive and feel overwhelmed by visual or au-
ditory stimuli, they may avert their gaze, put their hands over their ears, 
or avoid interaction with others. Likewise, McGeer [2001] suggests that 
in an effort to manage sensory experiences, subjects with ASD might 
feel the need to shut out other people; however, that makes it difficult 
for them to develop social and communicative skills. The more a child 
with ASD avoids interaction with others, the more s/he is deprived of 
the sorts of experiences needed for social development. Musical set-
tings provide a place where subjects can come together with other peo-
ple and begin to develop an intuitive understanding of what others are 
thinking and feeling. Coordinated musical improvisation, for example, 
may help give participants a sense of being part of meaningful shared 
activity. There are often moments in music therapy where there is a 
“buzz” between the two players, for example when they spontaneously 
come together at a cadence point or somehow know when to end or 
where to go next [Maratos et al. 2011, 92]. This kind of “communicative 
musicality” allows subjects to experience a kind of relating that is very 
different from that involved in talking, and yet offers them an avenue to 
overcome social isolation. In addition, it allows those who feel “out of 
sync” with the social world to “get back into the groove” of interacting 
with others.
To conclude, these reflections harbor an important lesson: instead 
of expecting children and adults with ASD to responsively conform to 
neurotypical mental institutions, we ought to explore ways of develop-
ing more inclusive institutions – in both everyday as well as therapeutic 
contexts – that provide a common space for individuals to get into the 
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groove with one another. To reach subjects with ASD, we need to move 
beyond “fixing” the heads of single individuals and instead consider 
ways of adjusting the social world.
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Abstract
We argue that the notion of “mental institutions” – discussed in recent debates about 
extended cognition – can help better understand the origin and character of social im-
pairments in autism, and also help illuminate the extent to which some mechanisms 
of autistic dysfunction extend across both internal and external factors (i.e., they do 
not just reside within an individual’s head). After providing some conceptual back-
ground, we discuss the connection between mental institutions and embodied habits 
of mind. We then discuss the significance of our view for understanding autistic 
habits of mind and consider why these embodied habits are sometimes a poor fit with 
neurotypical mental institutions. We conclude by considering how these insights 
highlight the two-way, extended nature of social impairments in autism, and how 
this extended picture might assist in constructing more inclusive mental institutions 
and intervention strategies.
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